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FRIEND REQUEST PENDING: DOES A RARE 
VICTORY BEFORE THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT MEAN 
SEX OFFENDERS WILL FINALLY RECEIVE FAIR 
TREATMENT FROM COURTS? 
 
 
MATT DILLINGER
*
 
 
Cite as: Matt Dillinger, Friend Request Pending: Does a Rare Victory Before the 
Seventh Circuit Mean Sex Offenders Will Finally Receive Fair Treatment from 
Courts?, 8 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 374 (2013), at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu 
/Documents/Academic Programs/7CR/v8-2/dillinger.pdf.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
That sex offenders as a group have few friends is an 
understatement. Of all members of society, they are perhaps the most 
despised and the least pitied.
1
 As such, sex offenders are prime targets 
for “tough-on-crime” legislators, and new laws imposing ever greater 
restrictions and burdens on this subset of criminal have proliferated 
rapidly in the last two decades.
2
 These laws often stretch constitutional 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1
 See Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are 
There Any Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17 (2008) 
(“American society has decided that there is no greater villain than the sex 
offender.”); Texas Sex Offenders in Sight of Rare Policy Win, CBS LOCAL (March 30, 
2013 9:33 AM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/03/30/texas-sex-offenders-in-sight-of 
-rare-policy-win (quoting two Texas Congressmen who have “no sympathy” for sex 
offenders).   
2
 See also Jamey Dunn, Sex offender legislation is often more about politics 
than justice, ILLINOIS ISSUES (September 2011),  http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/archives 
/2011/09/state.html. 
1
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boundaries and occasionally verge on the absurd.
3
 What is especially 
troubling is that these restrictive laws may be all for naught. Recent 
studies suggest that many of these laws are based more on urban 
legend and reactionism than actual research, and do little to keep the 
public safe. There is no reason to think the new laws, based on the 
same principles, will be any more effective.
4
 Further complicating 
things, lawmakers frequently refer to offenders as “monsters,” 
muddling whether the motivation behind new legislation is actually to 
protect the public or if lawmakers are merely acting out of individual 
fear, anger or revulsion.
5
     
                                                 
3
 For instance, Illinois recently passed a law prohibiting certain classes of sex 
offenders from participating “in a holiday event involving children under 18 years of 
age, including but not limited to distributing candy or other items to children on 
Halloween, wearing a Santa Claus costume on or preceding Christmas, being 
employed as a department store Santa Claus, or wearing an Easter Bunny costume 
on or preceding Easter.” 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3, as amended, June 22, 2012, effective 
January 1, 2013; see also Jamie Lee Curtis Taete, Sex Offenders in Florida Now 
Have Warning Signs Outside Their Homes, VICE (last visited June 17, 2013), 
http://www.vice.com/read/sex-offenders-in-florida-now-have-warning-signs-outside-
their-homes (discussing Florida Sheriff’s new policy of posting warning signs in 
front of the homes of sexual predators).  
4
 Most laws are based on misconceptions about who commits sex offenses, 
where they are committed, and why.  See Amol N. Sinha, Sects' Offenders: The 
Inefficacy of Sex Offender Residency Laws and Their Burdens on the Free Exercise 
of Religion, 16 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 343, 346 (2010) (discussing studies which 
show sex offender residency laws to be ineffective in preventing recidivism); Myths 
and Facts About Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. (August 2000), 
http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html; “Myths and Facts” Current Research 
on Managing Sex Offenders, NY ST. DIVISION OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVICES (April 
2008),  http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm; Myths and 
Misconceptions About Sex Offenders, OREGON SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE, 
http://oregonsatf.org/about-2/satf (last visited April 30, 2013). 
5
 “I questioned whether or not I was the ideal person to bring this [bill], 
because of the just revulsion I feel for people who have these convictions. Revulsion 
is not too strong a word. I mean these are not criminals that we're angry at. These are 
people that are just frightening to me and all of us, and I think rightfully so, and I 
don't have a lot of faith in our ability to rehabilitate people who would engage in this 
type of conduct.” Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012)(quoting 
Neb. Sen. Lautenbaugh from floor debate on recent sex offender legislation); see 
also Convicted Sex Offender Tells His Story as the Governor Tries to Get New Laws 
2
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Like elsewhere in society, sex offenders have generally found no 
great friend in the courts. Statutes prohibiting sex offenders from parks 
and other public places, creating permanent public registries, and 
requiring the release of offenders’ online identifiers have all been 
upheld as constitutional.
6
 These laws are often based on misconception 
and myth, such as the idea that sex offenders frequently target 
strangers in public places, or that the rate of sex offender recidivism is 
practically 100 percent. Furthermore, courts have relied on the same 
unsupported hearsay in upholding these laws that legislatures relied on 
in drafting them. However, the Seventh Circuit recently made clear 
that there are in fact limits on how far states can go in regulating even 
this particularly detested subset of society.
7
 
On January 23, 2013, the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Prosecutor, 
Marion County, Indiana held that an Indiana statute prohibiting sex 
offenders from using social networking websites violated the First 
Amendment.
8
 With this decision, registered sex offenders may at last 
have found a court sympathetic to their unique position in the 
legislative crosshairs.
9
 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
                                                                                                                   
Passed, WAFB (Apr. 07, 2008 7:07 PM CDT), 
http://www.wafb.com/Global/story.asp?S=8132017; see also Dan Gunderson, When 
Getting Tough Backfires, MPR NEWS (June 18, 2007), 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/standard/display/project_display.php?proj_identifie
r=2007/06/12/sexoffenders (“Sometimes what happens is lawmakers don't want to 
know the facts, or the facts don't make any difference," says [Minnesota Senator Tim 
Mathern]. "There really are two things that affect public policy. One is the facts. The 
other is the feelings and political pressure. There are legislators who will say, 'Don't 
confuse me with the facts. I've made up my mind.'"). 
6
 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s Sex 
Offender Registration Act was constitutional); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
350, 117 (1997) (holding that Kansas Sexual Predator Act, which allowed for 
indefinite civil confinement of certain sex offenders, was constitutional); Doe v. 
Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that Utah law requiring 
registration of all online identifiers and websites owned by sex offenders was 
constitutional); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
Florida’s sex offender notification/registration scheme and sex offender DNA 
registration statute were constitutional).   
7
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2013).   
8
 See id.  
9
 See id.   
3
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may just be the tip of the iceberg—part of an increasing trend towards 
requiring rationality in sex offender legislation, an area where states 
and localities have historically been able to do just about anything they 
wanted. Doe and its ilk may be a judicial death knell for irrational sex 
offender legislation, including statutes that have previously been ruled 
constitutional. With the increasing availability of information on sex 
offenders, outdated models of regulation may no longer meet even 
lower standards of review. At the very least, Doe is a sorely needed 
lesson for legislatures—hopefully one that will prompt more 
responsible lawmaking in the future.   
Part I of this comment provides some background on sex offender 
legislation and its treatment in court, and also introduces the Indiana 
law. Part II discusses the Doe case including both the district court 
decision and the Seventh Circuit decision. Part III examines the 
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in further detail and argues that Doe is 
part of a larger movement among courts to be more critical of sex 
offender legislation. It also discusses why sex offender legislation is 
misguided, what impact this may have on future court decisions, and 
suggests guidelines for drafting constitutional legislation. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Brief History of Sex Offender Legislation 
 
Sex offender regulation is a relatively new phenomenon.
10
 Despite 
its occasionally draconian undertones, what can be termed modern sex 
offender legislation did not appear until the early 1990s.
11
 However, 
that is not to say that there were no previous attempts to curb sex 
offenses with special laws.
12
 Surprisingly, however, the earlier 
legislation tended to focus much more on mental health treatment for 
                                                 
10
 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, 
MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION IN THE U.S. (2012).  
11
 See Roxanne Lieb et. al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 Crime & 
Just. 43, 53 (1998). 
12
 See id.   
4
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offenders and ensuring public safety than today’s laws, which focus 
primarily on shame and punishment.
13
  
Sex offender legislation can be divided into three historical 
periods.
14
 The first period, from the 1930s to the 1950s, mostly 
involved civil commitment statutes, which allowed for indefinite 
confinement of certain offenders.
15
 The second period, beginning in 
the 1970s and running into the late 1980s, can be characterized by 
increased penalties, greater awareness, and a continued focus on 
treatment.
16
 The final period, and the one most relevant to this 
comment, began in the early 1990s, and it is notable for post-
incarceration regulation of offenders, including registry schemes, 
public notification and residency restrictions.
17
   
Legislative efforts in the first period sought to respond to the 
problem of “sexual psychopaths.”18 In what has by now become 
standard operating procedure for enactment of sex offender legislation, 
these laws were passed in the wake of a few highly publicized sex 
crimes.
19
 The first of these laws was enacted in Michigan in 1935, and 
allowed a judge or jury to commit individuals charged with sex 
offenses to state hospitals or mental institutions if they were deemed to 
be “sexual psychopaths” posing a danger to society.20 This type of law 
authorizing civil commitment combined with psychiatric treatment 
typified early sex offender laws.
21
 Although sexual psychopath laws 
                                                 
13
 See id.   
14
 See id.   
15
 See id.   
16
 See id. at 54.  
17
 See id.  
18
 See id. at 55.  
19
 See Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday: The Rise and Fall of Twentieth 
Century Sexual Psychopath Laws, 69 La. L. Rev. 549, 571 (2009). 
20
 Id.   
21
 See People v. Smith, 275 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (1979) (“The criminal sexual 
psychopath statutes enacted in various jurisdictions were substantially the same, 
particularly with respect to their definition of a criminal sexual psychopathic person. 
Essentially, a sexual psychopath was defined as a person who, while not insane or 
feeble-minded, had a mental disorder coupled with propensities toward the 
commission of criminal sex offenses. Although the various sexual psychopath 
statutes were substantially consistent in defining a sexually psychopathic person, 
5
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created the possibility of indefinite civil commitment, the focus of the 
laws was prevention, treatment, and public safety, more than simply 
punishment.
22
   
The next wave of laws appeared in the 1970s as women’s groups 
led campaigns to increase awareness of date rape and other common 
types of sexual offenses that had previously received little attention.
23
 
Laws passed in this period often increased penalties for sex crimes, yet 
they also included treatment-based sentencing, demonstrating that 
rehabilitation was still an important goal.
24
    
While many laws are reactions to some perceived problem, 
modern sex offender legislation is exceptionally reactionary—almost 
always following soon after an especially notorious and shocking sex 
crime.
25
 Modern laws are wide-ranging, and include post-conviction 
civil confinement, registration and public notification laws, residency 
restrictions and other limitations on freedom.
26
 These laws apply to 
people convicted of a broad range of offenses from indecent exposure 
and statutory rape to sexual assault of a child.
27
 The first modern sex 
offender law was enacted in Washington State in 1990 after a 
particularly brutal and highly publicized attack on a young boy.
28
 The 
                                                                                                                   
they diverged somewhat in delineating the effect the adjudication of psychopathy 
had upon the underlying or pending criminal charge. For instance, some jurisdictions 
enacted sexual psychopath statutes under which criminal proceedings were abeyant 
until such time as the defendant was discharged from hospitalization. Other states 
had statutes which provided that a condition of sexual psychopathy did not constitute 
a defense to a criminal charge nor did it abrogate defendant's liability to be tried for 
the offense.); Roxanne Lieb et. al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 Crime & 
Just. 43, 55 (1998). 
22
 The two rationales of treatment-based sentencing were encouraging reporting 
and preventing recidivism.  Lieb, supra note 11, at 54. 
23
 Id. at 53.   
24
 See id.   
25
 See id. (noting that in most instances, new sex offender legislation is 
preceded by the sexual murder of a woman or child by a person with a history of 
sexual violence).  
26
 Id. at 70-75. 
27
 See generally BRENDA V. SMITH, FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF ADULT SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS (2009), available at ssrn.com.  
28
 See id. at 66.   
6
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public was outraged after a man raped and almost murdered a 7-year-
old boy just two years after his release from prison and after prison 
officials had specifically warned that they knew he would reoffend.
29
 
Shortly thereafter, Washington State’s Community Protection Act, 
unanimously approved, increased sentences for all sex offenses, 
implemented registration and notification programs, and created the 
nation’s first modern civil commitment laws for sex offenders.30 The 
Washington law quickly became a model for other states, and in 1994 
Congress passed the first major national sex offender regulation ‒ the 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offenders Registration Act.
31
 This landmark act, named after a 9-year-
old Minnesota boy who was abducted at gun-point and never found, 
required states to register and track sex offenders.
32
 Soon after, in 
response to the sexual assault and murder of seven-year-old Megan 
Kanka by a man previously convicted of sexual offenses against 
children, New Jersey enacted a particularly tough piece of 
legislation—dubbed “Megan’s Law”—requiring registration and 
community notification of offenders’ names, addresses and physical 
descriptions.
33
 By 1996, every state, the District of Columbia, and the 
Federal Government had enacted some variation of Megan's Law.
34
  
For every federal sex offender law that was enacted,
35
 state 
legislatures enacted many more.
36
 Between 2008 and 2012, over 550 
                                                 
29
 Id.  
30
 20 Year Anniversary of Washington’s Community Protection Act, KING 
CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT.’S OFF. (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/Prosecutor/news/2010/january/anniversary.aspx. 
31
 Jennifer Bleyer, Patty Wetterling questions sex offender laws, CITY PAGES 
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.citypages.com/2013-03-20/news/patty-wetterling-
questions-sex-offender-laws/full/. 
32
 Id.  
33
 See Richard G. Wright, supra note 1, at 30.  
34
 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003). 
35
 After the Jacob Wetterling Act, the federal legislation continued with the 
Pam Lyncher Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, the Jacob 
Wetterling Improvements Act in 1997, the Protection of Children from Sexual 
Predators Act in 1998, the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act in 2000, the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act in 1996, and the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act also in 2006. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF SEX OFFENDER 
7
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new laws governing sex offenders were enacted by states, territories, 
and D.C.
37
 These new statutes restricted where sex offenders could 
live, work, and travel; increased penalties; mandated stricter and more 
extensive registration with state and local authorities; prohibited sex 
offenders from designated places, jobs and activities; and expanded 
upon community notification requirements.
38
 The new laws spread so 
quickly that some commentators characterize the rush to regulate sex 
offenders as a legislative epidemic.
39
 Unfortunately, with this mad rush 
to show the public that something was being done, little time was 
spent figuring out whether the laws being created would actually make 
the public safer.      
 
B. Challenges to Modern Offender Statutes 
 
These tough new laws quickly faced legal challenges.
40
 Despite 
scant justification for the modern laws’ heavy burdens on offenders’ 
constitutional rights, these challenges met with little long-term success 
in court. One of the first such challenges, Smith v. Doe, objected to the 
retroactive application of sex offender registration laws.
41
 The 
plaintiffs in Smith v. Doe argued that Alaska’s version of Megan’s Law 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, which prohibits 
retroactive punishment.
42
 The law in question, which required both 
registration and notification of sex offenders, applied retroactively to 
all Alaskans convicted of sex offenses or child kidnapping.
43
 The Ex 
                                                                                                                   
SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION IN THE U.S. (2012).   
36
 See SEX OFFENDER ENACTMENTS DATABASE, NAT. CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/justice/sex-offender-
enactments-database.aspx (search terms: none) (last visited May 5, 2013).   
37
 Id.   
38
 See Id.    
39
 Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of 
Criminal Laws That Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). 
40
 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE supra note 35.  
41
 See id.   
42
 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
43
 Id.   
8
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Post Facto Clause concerns only penal statutes.
44
 Accordingly, the 
court reviewed the legislation to determine if it was akin to a penal 
statute, weighing “whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory 
scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a 
punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.”45 
The Court then found that “the stigma of Alaska's Megan's Law results 
not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the 
dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of 
which is already public.”46 The Court also found that the remaining 
factors suggested the statute was not punitive in nature, and therefore 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.47 However, Justices Stevens, 
Ginsberg, and Breyer all dissented from the majority’s opinion 
because “Alaska's Act imposes onerous and intrusive obligations on 
convicted sex offenders; and it exposes registrants, through aggressive 
public notification of their crimes, to profound humiliation and 
community-wide ostracism.”48 The dissent also argued that the Act 
was excessive in its non-punitive purpose, imposing significant 
restrictions and burdens upon offenders without regard for their risk of 
recidivism.
49
    
Similarly, in Cutshall v. Sundquist, the Sixth Circuit held that 
Tennessee’s registration and notification statute did not violate the 
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause or any other part of the 
Constitution.
50
 The plaintiff argued that the statute was punitive and 
thus punished him twice for the same offense. In support of this 
proposition he cited evidence that Tennessee legislators, in discussing 
the Act, had specifically said its purpose was to punish offenders and 
                                                 
44
 California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995). 
45
 Id. at 97.      
46
 Id. at 98.   
47
 See id. at 106.   
48
 See id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
49
 See id. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
50
 See Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 1999).   
9
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drive them from the state.
51
 He also argued that the ten-year 
registration was arbitrary and capricious and that the statute’s 
published location in the criminal code was itself evidence of the 
statute’s punitive nature.52 Furthermore, he argued, the public 
disclosure of registry information did not serve the state’s stated 
purpose of helping law enforcement, but instead merely subjects 
offenders to “stigmatization, ridicule, and harassment.”53  
The court analyzed the statute using seven factors articulated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.
54
 The court 
then concluded without serious consideration that pretty much every 
factor showed that the statute was non-punitive. For example, despite 
historical use of pillories to shame criminals, the court concluded that 
the notification statute serves as a safety tool rather than a scarlet 
letter.
55
 Furthermore, the court ignored entirely the evidence of the 
legislature’s intent that the plaintiff produced and took for granted the 
state’s claim that the notification statute makes the public safer.56     
Civil commitment statutes that allowed for potentially indefinite 
confinement were also held not to violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because they were not 
punitive in nature but rather forms of non-punitive detention.
57
 More 
recently, the North Carolina Supreme court upheld a statute that 
required global positioning tracking of sex offenders because the 
statute was enacted “with the intent to create a civil, regulatory scheme 
to protect citizens of our state from the threat posed by the recidivist 
                                                 
51
 See id.   
52
 Id.   
53
 Id.  
54
 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963); Cutshall, 193 
F.3d at 473. 
55
 See Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475.   
56
 See id. at 474-77.  
57
 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding that Kansas’s 
civil commitment statute violated neither the Ex Post Factor Clause nor the Double 
Jeopardy Clause); see also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965, 176 L. 
Ed. 2d 878 (2010) (holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Congress 
the authority to pass a federal civil commitment statute). 
10
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tendencies of convicted sex offenders.”58 Again, the court found that 
the statute was not punitive in nature and therefore did not violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.
59
 
Thus, the precedential landscape leading up to Doe made the 
plaintiff’s chances look rather bleak. Although the Indiana law 
ventured into somewhat uncharted legal territory given the effect on 
expression, the state had every reason to feel good about its chances.       
 
C. The Indiana Law 
 
On July 1, 2008, Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-12 took effect.
60
 
The law prohibited certain registered sex offenders from using social 
networking sites, instant messaging programs, and chat rooms that 
allow access to persons under the age of 18.
61
 Indiana’s law should not 
                                                 
58
 See State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 13 (2010). 
59
 See id.   
60
 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-12 (2008). 
61
 See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-12 (2008):   
Sec. 12. (a) This section does not apply to a person to whom all of the 
following apply: 
(1) The person is not more than: 
(A) four (4) years older than the victim if the offense was committed after June 
30, 2007; or 
(B) five (5) years older than the victim if the offense was committed before 
July 1, 2007. 
(2) The relationship between the person and the victim was a dating 
relationship or an ongoing personal relationship. The term “ongoing personal 
relationship” does not include a family relationship. 
(3) The crime: 
(A) was not committed by a person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of 
age; 
(B) was not committed by using or threatening the use of deadly force; 
(C) was not committed while armed with a deadly weapon; 
(D) did not result in serious bodily injury; 
(E) was not facilitated by furnishing the victim, without the victim's 
knowledge, with a drug (as defined in IC 16-42-19-2(1)) or a controlled substance 
(as defined in IC 35-48-1-9) or knowing that the victim was furnished with the drug 
or controlled substance without the victim's knowledge; and 
11
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(F) was not committed by a person having a position of authority or substantial 
influence over the victim. 
(b) This section applies only to a person required to register as a sex or violent 
offender under IC 11-8-8 who has been: 
(1) found to be a sexually violent predator under IC 35-38-1-7.5; or 
(2) convicted of one (1) or more of the following offenses: 
(A) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3). 
(B) Child exploitation (IC 35-42-4-4(b)). 
(C) Possession of child pornography (IC 35-42-4-4(c)). 
(D) Vicarious sexual gratification (IC 35-42-4-5(a) or IC 35-42-4-5(b)).  
(E) Sexual conduct in the presence of a minor (IC 35-42-4-5(c)). 
(F) Child solicitation (IC 35-42-4-6). 
(G) Child seduction (IC 35-42-4-7). 
(H) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2), if the victim is less than eighteen (18) years of 
age and the person is not the child's parent or guardian. 
(I) Attempt to commit or conspiracy to commit an offense listed in clauses (A) 
through (H). 
(J) An offense in another jurisdiction that is substantially similar to an offense 
described in clauses (A) through (H). 
(c) As used in this section, “instant messaging or chat room program” means a 
software program that requires a person to register or create an account, a username, 
or a password to become a member or registered user of the program and allows two 
(2) or more members or authorized users to communicate over the Internet in real 
time using typed text. The term does not include an electronic mail program or 
message board program. 
(d) As used in this section, “social networking web site” means an Internet web 
site that: 
(1) facilitates the social introduction between two (2) or more persons; 
(2) requires a person to register or create an account, a username, or a password 
to become a member of the web site and to communicate with other members; 
(3) allows a member to create a web page or a personal profile; and 
(4) provides a member with the opportunity to communicate with another 
person. 
The term does not include an electronic mail program or message board 
program. 
(e) A person described in subsection (b) who knowingly or intentionally uses: 
(1) a social networking web site; or 
(2) an instant messaging or chat room program; 
that the offender knows allows a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of 
age to access or use the web site or program commits a sex offender Internet offense, 
a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class D felony if the person has a 
prior unrelated conviction under this section. 
12
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have come as a surprise to anyone. With the increasing promulgation 
of post-incarceration sex offender regulation and the rise of the 
Internet and social media,
62
 it was only a matter of time before states 
began targeting sex offenders’ online activities.63 Fears of sex 
offenders grooming children via social networking sites such as 
Facebook and MySpace or otherwise engaging in cyber stalking are 
understandable, yet the actual incidence of sex offenders meeting 
children over the internet is extremely low.
64
 Indiana’s law and laws 
like it are a win-win for politicians like the Indiana law’s sponsors Jim 
Merrit and John Wasserman because there is no sex offender lobby to 
worry about upsetting and, because the laws are generally low-cost, 
most voters see no downside.
65
 New legislators are especially prone to 
                                                                                                                   
(f) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person: 
(1) did not know that the web site or program allowed a person who is less than 
eighteen (18) years of age to access or use the web site or program; and 
(2) upon discovering that the web site or program allows a person who is less 
than eighteen (18) years of age to access or use the web site or program, immediately 
ceased further use or access of the web site or program.  
62
 See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012)(citing evidence 
that “by the end of 2008 and the start of 2009, social networking became even more 
popular than e-mail”).   
63
 See Erin Mulvaney, State lawmakers move to restrict sex offenders, 
HOUSTON CHRON., (April 4, 2013), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/State-lawmakers-move-to-restrict-sex-offenders-4407867.php 
(quoting Texas Rep. Trey Martinez Fisher as saying, "[w]ith the evolving technology 
and increasing number of cyber crimes and crimes committed against the vulnerable, 
the goal is to extend the same policy we have for sex offenders now to the 
Internet.”).   
64
 See Janis Wolak et al., Online “Predators” and their Victims: Myths 
Realities and Implications for Prevention and Treatment, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 
63, 111-128 (2008), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/Am%20Psy%202-08.pdf (arguing 
that “publicity about online “predators” who prey on naive children using trickery  
and violence is largely inaccurate”).   
65
 See Jamey Dunn, Sex offender legislation is often more about politics than 
justice, ILLINOIS ISSUES (September 2011), 
http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/archives/2011/09/state.html; Ian Lovett, Public-Place 
Laws Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/us/sex-offenders-face-growing-restrictions-on-
public-places.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
13
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this kind of “get tough on crime” legislation because “nobody wants to 
be seen as being soft on sexual perversion.”66    
The Indiana law was presumably to be applied in conjunction 
with related legislation which required registered sex offenders not 
only to provide all online identifiers, such as email addresses and user 
names, but also to consent to a search of personal computers and any 
device with online access at any time, and to the installation of 
monitoring software or hardware.
67
 The latter two sections of this law 
were struck down in 2008 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
68
 
However, the social networking law survived another five years.
69
    
 
II. DOE V. PROSECUTOR, MARION COUNTY, INDIANA 
 
A. The District Court Decision  
 
On March 14, 2012, John Doe filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction preventing enforcement of the Indiana law on the basis that 
the law impermissibly infringed upon his First Amendment Rights; 
however, both parties agreed to treat the motion as for a permanent 
injunction and postponed the decision until after a full bench trial 
could be held.
70
 
Doe, who was allowed to file suit under a pseudonym so as not to 
face unnecessary public exposure and harassment during the pendency 
of the lawsuit,
71
 was a sex offender required to register on Indiana’s 
sex and violent offender registry.
72
 He was arrested in Marion County, 
Indiana in 2000 and later convicted of two counts of child 
                                                 
66
 See Dunn, supra note 67 (quoting Ill. Rep. Jim Sacia).  
67
 See Ind. Code § 11–8–8–8(a)(7) (2008); Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., 
Ind., 566 F. Supp. 2d 862, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2008).  
68
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 566 F. Supp. 2d at 867.  
69
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 
2013).   
70
 Id.   
71
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD (S.D. 
Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (order on plaintiff’s motion to proceed by anonymous name and 
motion to seal affidavit containing actual name).  
72
 Id.  
14
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exploitation.
73
 Released from prison in 2003, Doe completed probation 
in 2004.
74
 Doe is the father of a teenage son of whom he has custody 
and whose activities on Facebook and other websites he wishes to be 
able to monitor like any other parent.
75
 Doe brought this lawsuit 
alleging the unconstitutionality of the Indiana Law because he wishes 
to use social media to monitor his son’s internet use, as well as to stay 
in touch with friends and comment on the news.
76
    
District Court Judge Tanya Walton Pratt held that Indiana’s law 
was constitutional and denied both Doe’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and his request for permanent relief in the form of a 
declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction.
77
 Although the court 
conceded that the law implicated speech protected by the First 
Amendment, it nevertheless found the statute constitutional.
78
 To do 
so, the court applied the Supreme Court’s test from Ward v. Rock 
against Racism,
79
 which determines the constitutionality of regulations 
that restrict the “time, place, and manner” of expression, as opposed to 
statutes that prohibit specific forms of expression.
80
 In Ward, the Court 
held that New York City’s restrictions on volume at an outdoor concert 
venue did not target a specific type of expression—i.e. were content 
neutral—and therefore needed to satisfy only intermediate scrutiny.81 
The Court’s test asks whether a regulation is “narrowly-tailored to 
serve significant government interests” and if the regulation “leaves 
open ample alternative channels of communication.”82    
Applying the Ward standard, the court found the Indiana law 
constitutional because Doe failed to offer any alternative means 
through which Indiana could have achieved the same goal of 
                                                 
73
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., No. 1:12-CV-00062-TWP, 2012 WL 
2376141, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012). 
74
 Id.  
75
 Id.  
76
 Id.  
77
 Id. at 11. 
78
 Id. at 5.     
79
 Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 (1989).   
80
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 2012 WL 2376141, at *7. 
81
 See 491 U.S. at 781. 
82
 See id. at 803.   
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deterrence and prevention of online sexual exploitation of minors 
without violating his First Amendment rights. However, by placing 
this burden on Doe, the court confused who possessed the burden in 
the first place.
83
 While acknowledging the importance of social 
networking in society, Judge Pratt expressed concern over the use of 
new technologies as a “virtual playground” for criminals, in this case 
sexual predators.
84
 Even with the law, she stated, “the vast majority of 
the internet is still at Mr. Doe’s fingertips.”85   
The court next addressed Doe’s contention that the law was 
unnecessary and therefore not narrowly tailored because a separate 
law already existed in Indiana that prohibits online solicitation of 
children.
86
 While conceding that this argument had some appeal, the 
court stated that the two statutes serve different purposes; the 
challenged statute aimed to prevent and deter the sexual exploitation 
of minors because it punished conduct before minors were victimized, 
while the other aimed to punish those who have already committed the 
crime of solicitation.
87
  “The government need not wait until a crime 
was again committed in order to act to prevent criminal sexual acts,” 
said the court.
88
 Like so many before it, the court relied upon the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of recidivism by sex offenders as 
“frightening and high” rather than requiring the state to produce actual 
studies that show such a recidivism rate.
89
 The court also found that 
Doe had sufficient alternative channels of communication to satisfy 
the second half of the constitutional test, noting with some pop culture 
                                                 
 
83
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Indiana, 705 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 
2013) (explaining the state bears the burden of showing that the statute leaves open 
ample alternative channels of communication); Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., 
Ind., 2012 WL 2376141 at *7.  
84
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 2012 WL 2376141, at *2. 
85
 Id. at 7. 
86
 Id.  
87
 Id. at 8. 
88
 Id. at 9.    
89
 Id. at 8 (quoting Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84, 103, 123 (2003) (in which the 
court was quoting itself from McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)).    
16
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savvy that “communication does not begin with a ‘Facebook wall post’ 
and end with a ‘140-chracter Tweet.’”90   
Lastly, the court distinguished this case from Doe v. Jindal,
91
 in 
which the federal district court in Louisiana held a similar Louisiana 
statute unconstitutional.
92
 The court in Jindal held that the statute in 
question was overbroad in that it would prohibit offenders from 
accessing a substantial amount of websites that did not actually present 
a risk, such as the site of the court.
93
 Unlike the Indiana statute, the 
statute at issue in Jindal imposed a sweeping ban on common 
websites, not just social networking sites, and the Jindal court failed to 
use the proper content-neutral framework.
94
 Doe, dissatisfied with the 
district court’s decision, appealed to the Seventh Circuit.95    
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Decision 
 
On appeal, Doe got the ruling he was looking for.
96
 The Seventh 
Circuit, reviewing de novo, reversed the district court’s decision, 
finding the Indiana law unconstitutional on its face.
97
 The court found 
that Mr. Doe’s First Amendment rights, as incorporated against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, were clearly infringed by 
Indiana’s law.98 Specifically, the law precluded Doe from “expression 
through the medium of social media” and limited “his right to receive 
information and ideas.”99 However, the court found the law to be 
content neutral, as had the district court.
100
 Therefore, Indiana was 
                                                 
90
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 2012 WL 2376141, at *10. 
91
 Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (M.D. La. 2012).  
92
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 2012 WL 2376141, at *11.  
93
 See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
94
 Id. 
95
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 604, 604 (7th Cir.  
2013).  
96
 See id.   
97
 Id. (Judge Flaum and Tinder were joined in the decision by Judge Tharp who 
sat by designation).  
98
 See id. at 695. 
99
 Id. at 697-98. 
100
 Id. at 698.     
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entitled to place reasonable “time, place, or manner restrictions” on 
offenders’ expression so long as the statute met the Ward standard.101 
Under Ward,
102
 as the District Court had noted,
103
 such content neutral 
restrictions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest” and “leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”104 Unlike the district court, 
however, the Seventh Circuit never reached the second half of the test 
because they determined that the statute was not narrowly tailored.
105
  
In its analysis, the court relied on a series of Supreme Court cases 
that clarify when a law that infringes the freedom of speech may still 
be considered constitutional, starting with Frisby v. Schultz.
106
 In 
Frisby, abortion protestors challenged a municipal law that forbade 
picketers from engaging in picketing directed at a single residence.
107
 
The protesters had been intent on letting a local doctor know how they 
felt about abortion, and the legislature responded to protect the doctor 
and other private residents from harassment.
108
 Applying the content 
neutral test, the Court held that the law was narrowly tailored because 
it targeted only speech that was within the scope of the city’s 
significant interest in protecting residents from “targeted picketing” 
which, it said, “inherently and offensively intrudes on residential 
privacy.”109   
The Seventh Circuit then discussed City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent,
110
 in which the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that 
prohibited posting signs on public property.
111
 The Court in Vincent 
held the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of the 
                                                 
101
 Id.    
102
 Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  
103
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., No. 1:12-CV-00062-TWP, 2012 
WL 2376141, at *7 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012).    
104
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d at 798.  
105
 Id. 
106
 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). 
107
 Id. at 476.  
108
 Id.  
109
 Id. at 486.  
110
 City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
111
 Id. at 817.  
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plaintiffs who had wished to post cardboard candidate signs on public 
property.
112
 The court determined that because the substantive evil 
which the city sought to address—visual blight—was not merely a 
possible by-product of the activity prohibited but was created by the 
medium of expression itself, the statute was narrowly tailored.
113
  
Next, the court examined two cases where statutes had been 
struck down because the states involved had alternative means of 
combating the evil that their laws were designed to prevent.
114
 First, 
the court looked at Schneider v. Town of Irvington.
115
 In this 1939 
Supreme Court decision, the Court struck down a series of laws that 
banned outright, or banned without permission, the distribution of any 
handbills or fliers, or door-to-door canvassing.
116
 According to the 
Seventh Circuit, the Court in Schneider reached its decision because 
the evil the state sought to address—littering—was only indirectly 
being addressed by the law, and the state had numerous alternative 
ways to address the problem, i.e. going after the litterers themselves.
117
  
Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers,
118
 the Court invalidated a law 
prohibiting all door-to-door solicitations or distributions because the 
evil targeted by the law could be easily prevented by traditional 
methods, such as no trespassing signs.
119
 
The court then compared the foregoing case law to the Indiana 
statute. Neither party disputed that “there is nothing dangerous about 
Doe’s use of social media as long as he does not improperly 
communicate with minors.”120 And because illicit communication is a 
small part of overall social network activity, the Indiana law covered 
“substantially more activity than the evil it seeks to redress.”121   
                                                 
112
 Id.   
113
 Id. at 810.  
114
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 604, 698-99 (7th Cir. 
2013).  
115
 Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).  
116
 Id.  
117
 Id.  
118
 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943). 
119
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d at 699.  
120
 Id.  
121
 Id.  
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According to the court, like the legislatures in Martin and 
Schneider, Indiana had “other methods to combat unwanted and 
inappropriate communication between minors and sex offenders.”122 
Specifically, the state already had in place laws making it a felony for 
persons over 21 to “solicit” children,123 prohibiting “inappropriate 
communication with a child,” and communication “with the intent to 
gratify the sexual desires of the person or the individual,”124 all of 
which included enhanced punishments for acts performed over a 
computer network.
 125
 The court praised these “alternative options” as 
better methods for advancing Indiana’s goals and “refusing to burden 
benign Internet activity.”126 The court also disagreed with the district 
court judge’s characterization of the challenged law and the 
preexisting laws as possessing different purposes—one being to 
“prevent and deter” and one to “punish.”127 All laws are for the 
purpose of punishing activities after they’ve occurred, said the 
court.
128
 All Indiana’s law would do is increase sentences for online 
solicitation by providing another statute under which to convict 
offenders.
129
 If they want to increase sentences, said the court, the 
legislature should just do so without disguising it in this manner.
130
 
The court’s reasoning seems to ignore the point that the statute would, 
if effectively administered, prevent sex offenders who might be at risk 
of recidivism from placing themselves in positions where they might 
be enticed to do so—thus preventing injury before it occurs. However, 
the state also bore the burden of explaining how its legislation directly 
alleviates specific harms it seeks to cure and it failed to do so.
131
            
                                                 
122
 Id.  
123
 Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6 (2008)). 
124
 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-13 (2008).  
125
 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-13 (2008).  
126
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d at 699.  
127
 See id. (citing Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., No. 1:12-CV-00062-
TWP, 2012 WL 2376141, at *8 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012)).     
128
 Id.   
129
 See id.   
130
 See id.  
131
 See id.  
20
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After hammering the Indiana law’s over breadth, the court reeled 
in its criticism somewhat, noting that they “ . . . must be careful not to 
impose too high a standard on Indiana.”132 Ward introduced an 
“administratability exception” which provides that “the requirement of 
narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the [state interest] would be 
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”133 The court said that 
some level of over-inclusiveness might be justified where legislatures 
face a “great difficulty” in targeting only the “exact source” of evil.134 
In determining how to apply this exception, the court looked to a test 
from Colorado v. Hill, wherein the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
that prohibited anyone from approaching people within a 100-foot 
radius of a healthcare facility “for the purpose of passing a leaflet or 
handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education 
or counseling with [an]other person on public property.”135 According 
to the Court’s test, a statute may be constitutional if “(1) the prohibited 
expression that did not further the state interest was minimal, and (2) 
its inclusion stemmed from the difficulty in carving a rule that covered 
precisely the evil contemplated by the legislature.”136  However, the 
court found the Colorado exception to be inapplicable here, theorizing 
that Indiana could have, “with little difficulty,” better targeted the 
problem with the pre-existing statutes or a law solely banning 
communication between minors and sex offenders through social 
media.
137
 Leaving some room for future legislative action, the court 
suggested that a constitutional law that accomplishes Indiana’s goals is 
feasible, but declined to say exactly what it would look like.
138
   
Near the end of the opinion, the court cautiously suggested that if 
Indiana chooses to try again, it might be beneficial if they can develop 
an argument that the statute allows law enforcement to “swoop in” 
                                                 
132
 Id.  
133
 See Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
134
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cty. Ind., 705 F.3d 604, 700 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(citing Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000)).       
135
 See Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000).  
136
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d at 698-99 (citing Hill v. 
Colo., 530 U.S. at 729).     
137
 See id. at 700.  
138
 See id.  
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before any solicitation occurs.
139
 Perhaps, added the court, a potential 
new law could be tailored so as to apply only to certain especially 
risky persons.
140
 The court concluded that “subsequent Indiana statutes 
may well meet [the narrow tailoring requirement], but the blanket ban 
on social media in this case regrettably does not.”141 The Seventh 
Circuit then remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of Doe.
142
  
 
III. DOE’S IMPACT TODAY AND TOMORROW 
 
A. What makes Doe Different? 
 
Doe made clear that sex offenders have a right to surf the web and 
that states may not infringe upon this right without strong justification; 
yet, offenders have for years been barred from surfing the waves at 
California’s famous Huntington Beach—apparently constitutionally.143 
They have also been banned from public libraries in multiple cities 
and states, preventing access to books and the Internet.
144
 A majority 
of states now have statutes that forbid registered sex offenders from 
living within 500 to as much as 2,500 feet from schools or other areas 
children are likely to congregate.
145
 Florida’s residency restrictions are 
so strict that some sex offenders in Miami-Dade County have been 
forced to live in a makeshift colony under the Julia Tuttle Causeway, 
                                                 
139
 See id. at 701.  
140
 See id. at 702. 
141
 Id. at 703.  
142
 Id.  
143
 See Ian Lovett, Public-Place Laws Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/us/sex-offenders-face-
growing-restrictions-on-public-places.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
144
 See Iowa Code Ann. § 692A.113 (West) (banning certain sex offenders from 
being “present upon the real property of a public library without the written 
permission of the library administrator”).   
145
 Sinha, supra note 4, at 346.  
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 6
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 8, Issue 2                         Spring 2013 
 
396 
which connects Miami to Miami Beach.
146
 Unlike Indiana’s law that 
prohibits only online activity, none of these laws that restrict actual 
physical activity have been held to be unconstitutional. The question 
thus arises: why are states able to drastically limit where registered sex 
offenders can live, work and travel, yet at the same time, according to 
the Seventh Circuit, states are constitutionally forbidden from passing 
laws which impede only digital expression? Indeed, common sense 
makes this dichotomy hard to fathom.  
The clearest answer, of course, is speech. What immediately 
differentiates the Doe statute from other regulations that have been 
upheld as constitutional is that it implicated the First Amendment, 
specifically, the rights of speech, association, and, by implication, 
expression.
147
 Without a doubt, the Indiana law’s direct and substantial 
impact upon online speech gave the court what it needed to overturn 
the law.
148
 Laws which infringe upon rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment must satisfy the strictest standard of review, known as 
“strict scrutiny,” which requires that the law be narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling governmental interest.
149
 However, content 
neutral First Amendment restrictions must only satisfy the 
intermediate standard of review set out in Ward.
150
 As discussed 
previously, the court in Doe applied the intermediate standard of 
review to the Indiana social networking law because the court found it 
was a content neutral limitation upon expression.
151
 However, if 
another fundamental right were to be infringed by a statute, the 
reviewing court would generally apply strict scrutiny.
152
 
                                                 
146
 Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/us/10offender.html?_r=0. 
147
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
148
 See id.   
149
 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
150
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d at 698. 
151
 See id.   
152
 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1267 (2007). 
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However, where there is no fundamental or constitutional right 
implicated, a law must only satisfy rational basis review.
153
 Rational 
basis review is the most deferential standard used by reviewing courts 
and requires only that the governmental action be "rationally related" 
to a "legitimate" government interest.
154
 In most challenges to sex 
offender laws courts have applied this lesser standard of review.
155
 For 
instance, in Doe v. City of Lafayette, a city park district banned a 
registered sex offender from all of the city’s parks, long after he had 
completed probation and without a hearing, after learning that he had 
been seen sitting in his car at parks, seemingly observing the children 
playing there.
156
 The Seventh Circuit upheld the city’s actions.157 
Despite Mr. Doe’s contentions otherwise, the court held that the First 
Amendment was not implicated because Mr. Doe was going to the 
parks merely to watch children and not to engage in expressive 
protected activity.
158
 The court then held that the ban implicated no 
fundamental right because a fundamental right to enter public areas to 
loiter or for other innocent purposes does not exist.
159
 Thus, because 
no fundamental interest was implicated, the court applied rational 
                                                 
153
 See generally 16B C.J.S. CONST. LAW § 1120.   
154
 See Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004). 
155
 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 
(2003) (holding that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act did not violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause); Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 
155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (holding that the public disclosure provision of Connecticut's 
sex offender registration law did not violate the Due Process Clause); Doe v. City of 
Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d at 758-59; Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.2005) 
(holding residency restriction within two thousand feet of school or child care 
facility constitutional under rational basis review).   
156
 See Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d at 758-59. 
157
 Id.  
158
 See id. at 763 (“He did not go to the park to advocate the legalization of 
sexual relations between adults and minors. He did not go into the park to display a 
sculpture, read a poem or perform a play celebrating sexual relations between adults 
and minors. He did not go into the park for some higher purpose of self-realization 
through expression. In fact, he did not go into the park to engage in expression at 
all.”). 
159
 Id. at 769 (“The historical and precedential support for a fundamental right 
to enter parks for enjoyment is, to put it mildly, oblique.”). 
24
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basis review, asking whether the ban was “rationally related” to “a 
legitimate government interest.” 160 Noting that the city banned a 
single sex offender who had a history of sexually predatory actions 
towards children, and who had shown a potential to relapse, the court 
held that the city’s actions would have satisfied even strict scrutiny.161   
Similarly, in Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit upheld a 2002 Iowa 
law that prohibited certain sex offenders from residing within 2,000 
feet of schools or childcare facilities.
162
 Several sex offenders affected 
by the law brought suit in federal district court, asserting that the law 
was unconstitutional on its face.
163
 The district court in Doe v. Miller 
agreed with the plaintiffs, and noted that the law often made entire 
towns off limits to offenders.
164
 The district court, applying strict 
scrutiny, held that the residency restriction violated both procedural 
due process and substantive due process because it infringed on the 
plaintiffs’ fundamental right to travel and to “privately choose how 
they want to conduct their family affairs.”165 However, the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that even if they were to recognize the right to 
intrastate travel as a fundamental right, this right would not be 
infringed by a law which restricted only where sex offenders could 
live, not where they could travel.
166
 Therefore, the court determined 
that the law was rationally related to the goal of preventing sex 
offender recidivism, and thus constitutional.
167
 Despite the fact that the 
state’s own witness testified that “life-long restrictions like [the Iowa 
law] do not aid in the treatment process, and could even foster 
negative attitudes toward authority and depression in offenders,” and 
the Does’ contention that no scientific study backs the effectiveness of 
residency restrictions in preventing sex offense recidivism, the court 
held that the law was rationally related to that goal. According to the 
                                                 
160
 Id. at 773. 
161
 Id.   
162
 Iowa Code § 692A.2A (2009). 
163
 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2005). 
164
 See id.   
165
 Id. at 706. 
166
 Id.   
167
 Id. at 723. 
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court, the Does’ argument understated “the authority of a state 
legislature to make judgments about the best means to protect the 
health and welfare of its citizens in an area where precise statistical 
data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily 
unpredictable.”168 However, that authority can go only so far. The next 
section discusses some of the many common misconceptions about 
sex offenders.    
 
B. Separating Fact from Fiction 
  
In the early 1990s, when modern sex offender regulation began to 
appear, there was little reliable research on sex offenders, and none on 
the efficacy of modern legislation. In fact, even today the public 
perception of sex offenders is so skewed that numerous state and 
federal enforcement agencies have deemed it necessary to create 
“myths about sex offenders” websites in order to correct these 
misconceptions.
169
 Although concerns about sex offenders are valid, 
there are numerous myths that turn legitimate concerns into a blinding 
hysteria that leads to overzealous lawmaking and ineffective laws.
170
 
Much has been previously written debunking the “facts” about sex 
offenders; however, it is worth reviewing this topic briefly given its 
relevance to all sex-offender-related legislation and to show the vast 
difference between the actual truth and the perceived truth. 
One of the most common misconceptions, and one that has special 
relevance to statutes like Indiana’s, is that strangers perpetrate sex 
offenses. In fact, the vast majority of sex offenses are committed by a 
                                                 
168
 Id. at 714. 
169
 See Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. 
(August 2000), http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html; “Myths and Facts” 
Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, NY ST. DIVISION OF CRIM. JUSTICE 
SERVICES (April 2008), 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm; Myths and 
Misconceptions About Sex Offenders, OREGON SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE,  
http://oregonsatf.org/about-2/satf-membership/offender-management-
committee/myths-and-misconceptions-about-sex-offenders/ (last visited April 30, 
2013). 
170
 See 43 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULL. Art. 1. 
26
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person known to the victim, often a relative, friend, or authority 
figure.
171
 The numbers are even higher when it comes to sexual 
assaults on children, where over 90 percent of offenses are committed 
by someone known to the victim.
172
 Despite this, most legislation 
targets only the minority of offenses that are committed by strangers; 
yet, residency restrictions, registration and notification, and social 
networking bans do little to prevent those 80 to 90 percent of offenses 
that are committed by people the victim already knows. Misguided 
efforts like this suggest that legislators that push through sex offender 
regulation are more preoccupied with politics and getting elected than 
with actually keeping the public safe.
173
  
Another common myth is that sex offenders are virtually 
guaranteed to reoffend.
174
 Again, the facts do not support this 
condemnation.
175
 In comparison with recidivism rates of other types of 
criminals, sex offenders are actually significantly less likely to 
reoffend.
176
 A very small subset of offenders—adult males who abuse 
male children—are the most likely to reoffend.177 Although there is a 
surprising lack of comprehensive studies, and the studies that do exist 
                                                 
171
 See Wright, supra note 1, at 21; see also Lieb, supra note 11, at 50. 
172
 See Myths and Facts Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, N.Y. 
ST. DIVISION OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVICES (April 2008), 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm.  
173
 See also Jamey Dunn, Sex Offender Legislation is often more about politics 
than justice, ILL. ISSUES, http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/archives/2011/09/state.html 
(September 2011)(“Illinois for a long time has every new set of legislators come in, 
and they pass bills on crime because it looks good when you go back home and you 
say, ‘I’m tough on crime.’ So what happens is, we’re now layered with bill after bill 
after bill,” Rep. Rosemary Mulligan, a Park Ridge Republican, said in the last days 
of the spring legislative session while debating a bill that pertained to sex offenders. 
“Most of us will vote for it because it looks bad if you don’t, which is a mistake that 
happens when we continue to pass these kinds of laws.” Mulligan and 90 of her 
House colleagues voted in favor of the bill.”). 
174
 See id.  
175
 Id.  
176
 Wright, supra note1, at 27 (“A study of Massachusetts prisoners released in 
1999 found that 28% of sex offenders were re-incarcerated within three years of their 
release. This was the lowest rate of recidivism (as measured by re-incarceration) 
when compared with other groups of non-sexual criminal offenders.”). 
177
 See id.  
27
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often offer conflicting results, it does not seem to be the case that sex 
offenders in general are nearly as likely to commit another sex offense 
in the future as politicians would make them out to be.
178
 Indeed, it 
bears noting that recidivism rates vary drastically based upon what 
category of offender is being measured and how the recidivism rate is 
being measured.
179
  
A third and extremely pertinent myth is that residency restrictions 
and other common legislative action directed at sex offenders are 
effective in protecting the public.
180
 There is in fact little if any 
evidence that this is the case.
181
 Rather than preventative, these 
measures appear to be punitive in nature, satisfying the public’s desire 
for revenge on an especially reviled subset of criminals.
182
 Some 
commentators have even argued that, rather than deterring future sex 
offenses, residency restrictions and other legislation that prevent sex 
offenders from reintegrating with society actually increase the risk of 
recidivism.
183
 
Furthermore, not all sex offenders pose the same danger to the 
public. One of the many criticisms of modern sex offender laws is that 
they indiscriminately target all offenders regardless of their individual 
risk. Indeed, this was part of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Doe. 
For instance, individuals convicted of Romeo and Juliet relationships, 
public indecency, or consensual sex by a teacher with a teenage 
                                                 
178
 See id.  
179
 See id.  
180
 See Myths and Facts Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, N.Y. 
ST. DIVISION OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVICES (April 2008), 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm.  
181
 See Margaret Troia, Ohio's Sex Offender Residency Restriction Law: Does It 
Protect the Health and Safety of the State's Children or Falsely Make People Believe 
So?, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 331, 344 (2005).  
182
 See Peter Whoriskey, Some Curbs on Sex Offenders Called Ineffective, 
Inhumane, WASH. POST (Wednesday November 22, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/21/AR2006112101468.html (quoting Georgia House 
Majority Leader as describing his goal in sex offender residency legislation as “ . . . 
to make it so onerous on those that are convicted of these offenses . . . they will want 
to move to another state.”).     
183
 See Troia, supra note 182, at 344.  
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student can hardly be equated with violent rapists and offenders whose 
victims were children.
184
   
As some modern legislation nears a quarter century of existence, 
studies are beginning to appear examining the efficacy of these laws. 
These studies overwhelmingly show modern sex offender legislation 
to be ineffective. For instance, a study by the Minnesota Department 
of Corrections that examined 224 recidivist sex offenders determined 
that residency restrictions would have likely had no preventative effect 
in any of the cases studied.
185
 Studies in Iowa, California and 
Colorado all concluded the same thing.
186
 A 2011 study focusing on 
the effects of notification laws nationally concluded that they actually 
increased recidivism because they made illegal activity more attractive 
by increasing social and financial costs to offenders attempting to 
rejoin society.
187
 Another recent study of registration laws on a 
national level led the authors to conclude that sex offender registry 
statutes not only failed to reduce recidivism but actually increased 
rates of re-offense.
188
 Studies like these should influence court rulings 
in the future.    
                                                 
184
 See Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512, 522 (1998)(quoting 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)(“Requiring the government to assemble and present clear evidence of a 
sex offender's dangerousness would ensure that limited adjudicatory and police 
enforcement resources would be concentrated on those individuals who realistically 
may pose threats to young children and other vulnerable populations. As observed in 
an altogether different context but oddly apropos of this classification system as 
well, “when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system 
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless.”). 
185
 Sinha, supra note 4, at 347 (“Only 79 (35 percent) of the cases involved 
offenders who established direct contact with their victims. Of these, 28 initiated 
victim contact within one mile of their own residence, 21 within 0.5 miles (2,500 
feet), and 16 within 0.2 miles (1,000 feet). A juvenile was the victim in 16 of the 28 
cases. But none of the 16 cases involved offenders who established victim contact 
near a school, park, or other prohibited area. Instead, the 16 offenders typically used 
a ruse to gain access to their victims, who were most often their neighbors.”). 
186
 Id. at 348.   
187
 See Matthew Phillips, Are Sex Offender Laws Backfiring, 
FREAKONOMICS.COM (Sept. 1, 2011, 11:25 a.m.), 
http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/09/01/are-sex-offender-laws-backfiring/.   
188
 Id.   
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Acknowledging these facts and fictions is extremely important in 
the constitutional review of statutes governing sex offenders. 
However, for the most part, courts have not done so. In 2002, the 
Supreme Court in McKune v. Lile
189
 remarked that sex offenders had a 
“frightening and high risk of recidivism,” and despite a lack of actual 
research justifying this statement, courts have cited this decision as 
evidence of sex offenders’ high rates of recidivism ever since.190 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in just one sentence, determined that 
California had a rational basis for its sex offender notification laws, 
saying: “[s]ex offenders pose a threat to the public, and when they 
reenter society, they are much more likely to be re-arrested than other 
offenders.”191  
In Doe, the Seventh Circuit took an important step towards 
treating sex offender legislation like any other type of legislation, and 
away from the self-perpetuating reliance on myth that has dominated 
sex offender jurisprudence for many years/decades. Just how much 
effect this move will have in litigating the constitutionality of sex 
offender laws is directly related to the type of statute at issue and what 
type of review the courts apply. The next section discusses the 
importance of these distinctions.      
 
C. A Changing Tide in the Courts? 
 
While challenges to sex offender legislation have almost 
universally failed in the past,
192
 recently courts have been more 
                                                 
189
 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 (2002). 
190
 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (citing McKune to justify a 
finding that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act was non-punitive and thus not a 
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
191
 Johnson v. Terhune, 184 F. App'x 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2006). 
192
 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s Sex 
Offender Registration Act was constitutional); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
350, 117 (1997) (holding that Kansas Sexual Predator Act, which allowed for 
indefinite civil confinement of certain sex offenders, was constitutional); Doe v. 
Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that Utah law requiring 
registration of all online identifiers and websites owned by sex offenders was 
constitutional); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
30
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inclined to review such legislation closely and to strike down laws that 
do not meet constitutional standards.
193
 This increased skepticism 
comes as studies increasingly suggest that existing laws are ineffective 
despite their ubiquity. Several recent cases illustrate this change in the 
judicial review of sex offender legislation.   
In January 2012, in Doe v. City of Albuquerque, the Tenth Circuit 
struck down an Albuquerque law that banned sex offenders from 
public libraries.
194
 The court first chastised the city for failing to offer 
a justification for the law; however, it then provided one itself, stating 
that, “it is evident that the ban seeks to provide a safe environment for 
library patrons, including children.”195 Nevertheless, the court held 
that the law was unconstitutional because the city had failed to show 
that the law was narrowly tailored or that it left open ample alternative 
channels of communication.
196
 In fact, the City erroneously concluded 
that it had no burden to prove the existence of these alternatives and 
thus presented no evidence.
197
 Accordingly, while the outcome of the 
case is encouraging, it does not stand for the premise that library bans 
are unconstitutional, but merely that the government must present at 
least some justification for such a law if it is to be upheld.
198
   
In Doe v. Jindal, nine prostitutes convicted under Louisiana’s 
Crimes Against Nature by Solicitation statute, which makes a separate 
offense for those who solicit oral or anal sex, challenged the statute’s 
requirement that they register as sex offenders as a violation of the 14
th
 
                                                                                                                   
Florida’s sex offender notification/registration scheme and sex offender DNA 
registration statute were constitutional).   
193
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 
2013); Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1134 (10th Cir. 2012); Doe v. 
Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599-600 (M.D. La. 2012); Doe v. Nebraska, No. 
8:09CV456, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. Neb. Oct. 17, 2012). 
194
 Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d at 1134. 
195
 Id.   
196
 Id. at 1133-1136. 
197
 Id. at 1115 (“Complicating our inquiry is the fact that the City, relying on a 
mistaken interpretation of case law regarding facial challenges, erroneously 
contended that it had no burden to do anything in response to Doe's summary 
judgment motion.”). 
198
 See id. at 1135. 
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it treated them 
differently from those convicted under the regular prostitution 
statute.
199
  In 2012, the U.S. District Court held that there was no 
rational basis for treating those convicted under the former statute 
differently from those convicted under the latter and granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs.
200
 
Again in Louisiana, on June 14, 2011, Governor Bobby Jindal 
signed into law a statute very similar to Indiana’s.201 The law, like 
                                                 
199
 Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (E.D. La. 2012). 
200
 Id. at 1008. 
201
 See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599-600 (M.D. La. 2012); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14:91.5 (2012): 
A. The following shall constitute unlawful use or access of social media: 
(1) The using or accessing of social networking websites, chat rooms, and peer-
to-peer networks by a person who is required to register as a sex offender and who 
was previously convicted of R.S. 14:81 (indecent behavior with juveniles), R.S. 
14:81.1 (pornography involving *600  juveniles), R.S. 14:81.3 (computer-aided 
solicitation of a minor), or R.S. 14:283 (video voyeurism) or was previously 
convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 in which the victim of the sex 
offense was a minor. 
(2) The provisions of this Section shall also apply to any person previously 
convicted for an offense under the laws of another state, or military, territorial, 
foreign, tribal, or federal law which is equivalent to the offenses provided for in 
Paragraph (1) of this Subsection, unless the tribal court or foreign conviction was not 
obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the 
accused as provided by the federal guidelines adopted pursuant to the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. 
B. The use or access of social media shall not be considered unlawful for 
purposes of this Section if the offender has permission to use or access social 
networking websites, chat rooms, or peer-to-peer networks from his probation or 
parole officer or the court of original jurisdiction. 
C. For purposes of this Section: (1) “Chat room” means any Internet website 
through which users have the ability to communicate via text and which allows 
messages to be visible to all other users or to a designated segment of all other users. 
(2) “Minor” means a person under the age of eighteen years.(3) “Peer-to-peer 
network” means a connection of computer systems whereby files are shared directly 
between the systems on a network without the need of a central server. (4) “Social 
networking website” means an Internet website that has any of the following 
capabilities: (a) Allows users to create web pages or profiles about themselves that 
are available to the general public or to any other users. (b) Offers a mechanism for 
32
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Indiana’s, prohibited certain sex offenders, specifically those whose 
crimes involved children, from accessing “social networking web 
sites, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks.”202 John and James Doe 
challenged the statute (pseudonymously, as is standard in such cases) 
as facially overbroad and unconstitutionally affecting their First 
Amendment rights.
203
 The plaintiffs contended that the law would 
prohibit them not only from accessing many websites, including 
Facebook, but also, “NOLA.com, CNN.com, FoxNews.com, ESPN, 
BBC or Reuters, NYTimes.com, Politico.com, Newsweek, The 
Economist, National Geographic, YouTube, Getagameplan.org 
(Louisiana's official hurricane preparedness website), Gmail, Yahoo, 
Hotmail, AOL, Linkedln, Monster, USAJOBS.gov (the federal 
government's employment database), eBay, Zagat, and Amazon” 
because the sites “have a mechanism for communication among 
users.”204 The court acknowledged that the states have a legitimate 
interest in protecting children from sex offenders; however, relying on 
Hill v. City of Houston,
205
 the court held that the Louisiana Act was not 
crafted narrowly or precisely enough to pass constitutional muster.
206
   
The strongest condemnation came in a recent decision by the 
United States District Court for Nebraska that held unconstitutional a 
                                                                                                                   
communication among users, such as a forum, chat room, electronic mail, or instant 
messaging. 
D. (1) Whoever commits the crime of unlawful use or access of social media 
shall, upon a first conviction, be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and shall 
be imprisoned with hard labor for not more than ten years without benefit of parole, 
probation, or suspension of sentence. (2) Whoever commits the crime of unlawful 
use or access of social media, upon a second or subsequent conviction, shall be fined 
not more than twenty thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with hard labor for 
not less than five years nor more than twenty years without benefit of parole, 
probation, or suspension of sentence. 
202
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.5 (2012). 
203
 Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
204
 Id.   
205
 Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1113 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that a 
statute that made it unlawful to “in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt” a 
police officer in the execution of his duty was unconstitutionally overbroad).  
206
 Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (the court also found the Act to be 
unconstitutionally vague).  
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Nebraska law which, for all its similarities with the Indiana law, could 
have been the product of bi-state cooperation. Judge Kopf remarked in 
the opening of the opinion that if the people of Nebraska want to go to 
hell it is his job to get them there; however, he chided, they must get 
there constitutionally and Nebraska’s sex offender legislation 
“violently swerved from that path.”207  
The Nebraska statutes at issue in Doe v. Nebraska criminalized 
certain use of social networking sites by sex offenders, required them 
to provide all identifiable internet information, such as email 
addresses, passwords, blogs, screen-names, etc., and required them to 
consent to searches of their computers and electronic devices by law 
enforcement. The court held that the statute that banned access to 
social networking sites was not narrowly tailored and did not leave 
open ample alternative channels.
208
 Instead, the court said that the 
legislation went too far and covered too much, admonishing 
lawmakers to “use a scalpel rather than a blunderbuss” in crafting 
laws.
209
 The really shocking ruling, however, was yet to come.  
The court found that the intent of the legislature in passing these 
statutes was to punish sex offenders rather than to protect the public, 
and that the bill’s sponsor had acted out of “rage” and “revulsion.”210 
Accordingly, the court held that the statutes were unconstitutional 
because they violated the state and federal prohibitions of ex post facto 
laws. The court, noticeably troubled, stated:  
                                                 
207
 Doe v. Nebraska., No. 8:09CV456, 2012 WL 4923131 at *17 (D. Neb. Oct. 
17, 2012).  
208
 Id. (“The age of the triggering conviction does not matter. The fact that the 
offender has a clear record since the conviction does not matter. The fact that the 
offender is not under court supervision does not matter. The fact that the offender 
legitimately needs access to the banned sites to make his or her living does not 
matter. The fact that the offender legitimately needs access to the banned sites to 
obtain news that probably cannot be obtained in another way does not matter. The 
fact that the offender legitimately needs access to the banned sites to check on the 
health and well being of his children while they are in a distant hospital does not 
matter. The fact that the offender did not use any of the banned sites to commit his or 
her crime does not matter.”). 
209
 Id. at 20.   
210
 See id. at 4.  
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These statutes retroactively render sex offenders, who were 
sentenced prior to the effective date of these statutes, second-
class citizens. They are silenced. They are rendered insecure 
in their homes. They are denied the rudiments of fair notice. 
In Nebraska's “rage” and “revulsion,” they are stripped of 
fundamental constitutional rights. In short, sex offenders who 
were sentenced prior to the enactment of these laws are 
punished.
211
 
This language goes beyond where the Seventh Circuit or any 
other court has gone, actively accusing the state of acting improperly 
in enacting such laws. Unlike previous courts, the court refused to 
uphold sex offender legislation on possibility and tradition alone. 
State courts have also begun to reject sex offender legislation as 
unconstitutional on both state and federal grounds.
212
 For instance, 
four state supreme courts recently held that sex offender legislation 
violated the respective state constitutional prohibitions against ex post 
facto laws.
213
 However, Doe, as the first big federal appellate 
decision,
214
 stands at the forefront of the recent decisions that have 
confirmed that sex offenders are still deserving of constitutional rights 
despite their previous actions, and that legislatures cannot create 
statutes without some justification for doing so. The next section 
examines what the Doe ruling means for the future of sex offender 
legislation and litigation.   
 
                                                 
211
 Id. at 34.  
212
 See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 
(Ind. 2009); Maine v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009); State v. Williams, 952 
N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011).  
213
 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 999; Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d at 371; Maine v. 
Letalien, 985 A.2d at 4; State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1108. 
214
 Just three days before the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Tenth Circuit 
struck down an Albuquerque law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing 
public libraries. However, rather than a meaningful ruling, the decision was likely 
due to an error on the part of the City’s attorneys who thought they had no burden in 
the case. See Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012).  
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D. Moving Forward 
 
After Doe, it is clear that where First Amendment rights are 
implicated, state sex offender laws do not pass constitutional muster 
just because the state claims an interest in protecting children.
215
 
Furthermore, Doe suggests certain existing laws may be vulnerable to 
challenge. For instance, the Illinois “Santa Clause statute” states as 
follows: 
 
(c-2) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to participate in a 
holiday event involving children under 18 years of age, 
including but not limited to distributing candy or other items 
to children on Halloween, wearing a Santa Claus costume on 
or preceding Christmas, being employed as a department 
store Santa Claus, or wearing an Easter Bunny costume on or 
preceding Easter. For the purposes of this subsection, child 
sex offender has the meaning as defined in this Section, but 
does not include as a sex offense under paragraph (2) of 
subsection (d) of this Section, the offense under subsection 
(c) of Section 11-1.50 of this Code. This subsection does not 
apply to a child sex offender who is a parent or guardian of 
children under 18 years of age that are present in the home 
and other non-familial minors are not present.
216
 
 
The Santa Claus statute restricts expressive conduct protected by 
the First Amendment because non-verbal communication is protected 
by the First Amendment, especially where “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message [is] present” and “the likelihood [is] great that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”217 The 
statute prevents offenders from being employed as mall Santas, which 
it is hard to find fault with.  However, it would also prevent an 
offender from performing in a play or comedic holiday performance 
                                                 
215
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 
2013).   
216
 720 ILCS § 5/11-9.3 (2013).  
217
 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).   
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that involved dressing like one of these characters. Furthermore, and 
more worrisome, the law also prevents a child sex offender from 
“participating in a holiday event involving children under the age of 
18.” This provision could potentially prohibit substantial expression. 
For instance, it would arguably prevent offenders from participating in 
church activities, such as Christmas or Hanukkah services, attending 
an Earth Day or Labor Day rally, taking part in a New Year’s Eve 
celebration, or a Thanksgiving dinner. Even putting aside any void for 
vagueness arguments,
218
 this statute is on shaky ground. Although the 
Santa Claus statute, unlike the Indiana law, limits its application only 
to sex offenders who committed offenses involving minors, given the 
massive potential limitation on expression and the lack of evidence 
that it would be successful, a strong argument could be made that it is 
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 
Like many sex offender laws, the Santa Clause statute is based upon 
myth and fear rather than empirical evidence or rational debate.
219
 
Thus, just as the state in Doe failed to show any evidence that 
individuals covered by the law posed the specific risk sought to be 
alleviated, Illinois would likely be unable to show a legitimate risk of 
offenses on the dates, times, or places covered by the law. 
Relatedly, laws forbidding sex offenders from public libraries are 
becoming increasingly popular.
220
 Although a library ban was very 
                                                 
218
 A “holiday event” is not clearly defined in the statute and could be 
unconstitutional on that ground alone. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 
617 (1954)(“The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.”). 
219
 See M. Benjamin Snodgrass, The Specter of Sex Offenders on Halloween: 
Unmasking Cultural, Constitutional, and Criminological Concerns, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 
417, 419 (2010) (despite a desire to restrict what sex offenders can do, research has 
uncovered only one incident of a person who victimized a child during the course of 
trick-or-treating.”). 
 
220
 See Jennifer Ekblaw, Not in My Library: An Examination of State and Local 
Bans of Sex Offenders from Public Libraries, 44 IND. L. REV. 919 (2011)(“ . . . 
political leaders in Albuquerque, New Mexico, New Bedford, Massachusetts, 
Quincy, Massachusetts, Methuen, Massachusetts, Stephenville, Texas, Rowan 
County, North Carolina, and the State of Iowa have attempted to protect children by 
prohibiting sex offenders from entering public libraries.”). 
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recently struck down as unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit, the court 
strongly hinted that its decision was based on the state’s error to 
appreciate its burden, and that a future statute could easily pass 
muster.
221
 Thus, it is not yet clear how courts will react to challenges 
to such statutes when actually defended by the state.
222
 However, 
based on Doe, there is a strong argument that this type of statute is 
unconstitutional. The First Amendment includes not just a right to 
speak but also to receive information.
223
 Therefore, the library bans 
should receive the same intermediate review as the Indiana statue in 
Doe. Under this intermediate review, most such statutes would clearly 
fail unless they targeted only those offenders who the state had reason 
to believe were at a high risk of recidivism. Furthermore, a state would 
have to show a real risk rather than “simply posit the existence of the 
disease sought to be cured,” which may be hard considering the 
relative rarity of attacks on children by strangers and the fact that the 
number of such attacks that have taken place likely number in the 
single digits in the entire United States. Doe would be a persuasive 
case to sight in a challenge to any such statute.   
The Seventh Circuit indicated in Doe that a constitutional 
reworking of Indiana’s law was possible. However, for a new law to 
be constitutional, Indiana “must do more than simply posit the 
existence of the disease sought to be cured,” and “the regulation 
                                                 
221
 See Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(“Complicating our inquiry is the fact that the City, relying on a mistaken 
interpretation of case law regarding facial challenges, erroneously contended that it 
had no burden to do anything in response to Doe's summary judgment motion. 
Consequently, the City failed to present any evidence as to the reasons or 
justification for its ban, whether the ban was narrowly tailored to address the interest 
sought to be served, or whether the ban left open alternative channels for receiving 
information. Had the City done so, it is not difficult to imagine that the ban might 
have survived Doe's challenge, for we recognize the City's significant interest in 
providing a safe environment for its library patrons, especially children.”). 
222
 See id.   
223
 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).   
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[must] in fact alleviate those harms in a direct and immediate way.”224 
The next section discusses what future laws might look like.   
 
E. Indiana Legislators Respond to the Seventh Circuit’s Ruling 
 
The Doe decision had scarcely been published when Hoosier 
legislators began scrambling to enact a constitutional version of the 
recently rejected law.
225
 The bill, which is currently pending, limits 
applicability of the act to those sex offenders convicted of either class 
A felony child molestation or child solicitation.
226
 In addition, the Act 
makes direct solicitation of a minor via social networking sites a 
crime.
227
 Although the second provision is likely constitutional,
228
 the 
legislators’ effort to render constitutional the first provision is 
insufficient. Indiana must “present some evidence, beyond conclusory 
assertions,” in order to justify legislation limiting access to social 
networking sites.
229
 The revised Indiana bill, although certainly 
narrower than its predecessor, will fail for some of the same reasons 
that the initial attempt did, particularly that there is little to no 
evidence to show that this regulation would actually make Hoosier 
children safer.
230
 State senators Jim Merrit and John Wasserman 
merely amended the previous statute to apply to a slightly narrower 
group of offenders.
231
 However, studies have shown that not only are 
sex offenses much more likely to be committed by a person already 
                                                 
224
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
225
 See S.B. 0220, 2013 Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).    
226
 See id.  
227
 Id.  
228
 It does; however, appear to be a mere backdoor way of increasing potential 
prison terms as the court mentioned in its decision.  See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion 
Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2013).   
229
 See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d at 702.   
230
 Press Release, Senate Rep. Caucus, Sens. Merrit, Wasserman Author Bill to 
Reinstate Restrictions on Sex Offender Access to Social Media (Jan. 28, 2013), 
available at 
http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=702
93&information_id=141668&type=&syndicate=syndicate.  
231
 See id.   
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known to the victim, but that when sex offenders do meet their 
“victims” over the internet they are almost always between the ages of 
13 and 17 and the sex is consensual.
232
 Thus, if sex offenders 
grooming child victims over the internet is not the problem legislators 
and the media make it out to be, then Indiana’s law will have to be 
even narrower to justify such a substantial abridgement of First 
Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit suggested that a similar law 
that applies only to those “individuals whose presence on social media 
impels them to solicit children” would be constitutional.233 For 
instance, if the law prohibited only those registered sex offenders 
whose triggering offense involved minors and the Internet, it would 
likely be constitutional.
234
 That is not what the senators have 
proposed.
235
 Another solution for Indiana would be to hold 
individualized hearings on individuals deemed likely to pose a high 
risk of online recidivism.
236
 Unfortunately, Indiana’s revised statute 
would likely fail a constitutional challenge because its proponents are 
relying on the same reactionary political motivations that have created 
most of our modern sex offender laws, rather than attempting a serious 
examination of the issues.   
In the coming years, there is no doubt that legislatures, like 
Indiana’s, will target sex offenders’ online activities. Furthermore, 
some of these laws will pass constitutional muster.  In crafting new 
laws, legislatures should take the following approach: (1) determine 
                                                 
232
 See Janis Wolak et al., Online “Predators” and their Victims: Myths 
Realities and Implications for Prevention and Treatment, # AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGIST 63, 111-128 (2008), available at 
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/Am%20Psy%202-08.pdf (“Many of the media stories 
and much of the Internet crime prevention information available suggest that it is 
naïve and inexperienced young children who are vulnerable to online child molesters 
(e.g., Blustein, 2007; Boss, 2007; Crimaldi, 2007; Manolatos, 2007). However, 99% 
of victims of Internet-initiated sex crimes in the N-JOV Study were ages 13 to 17 (M 
= 14.46, SD = .14), and none were younger than 12 (Wolak, et al., 2004)”).   
233
 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 702 (7th Cir. 2013).            
234
 See id.   
235
 Press Release, supra note 231. 
236
 See id. (discussing a Kansas civil commitment law that provided 
individualized assessments for offenders).   
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the exact evil that needs preventing; (2) hold hearings on how to best 
target that evil emphasizing empirical data and serious discussion and 
discouraging invective;
237
 and (3) craft a law based on the hearings 
that targets the exact evil. If these steps are followed, not only will the 
outcome likely be constitutional, but it also will be much more likely 
to actually protect children and, in general, to keep society safer.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Doe, along with it brethren, may not signal a sea change in the 
courts’ approach to constitutional challenges to sex offender 
legislation, but there is an undeniable shift in the courts towards more 
sensible review of sex offender legislation, an area where irrational 
legislation has historically been upheld almost without question. While 
the First Amendment is not as clearly implicated in the majority of sex 
offender regulation as it was in Doe, First Amendment analysis can 
reasonably be argued to apply to some existing regulations, such as 
those prohibiting sex offenders from public libraries. Additionally, 
because much of  modern sex offender legislation is crafted based on 
gut reaction rather than serious study, some statutes may well fail even 
rational basis review in the future. As studies increasingly show the 
inefficiency of current laws and break down the misconceptions 
surrounding sex offenders, there may be cause to revisit challenges to 
existing legislation.  
Additionally, legislatures should take heed of both the courts’ 
recent skepticism and the emergence of new data exposing the 
misconceptions surrounding sex offenders, and they should use these 
tools as motivation to craft better laws. If a safe society is the goal, 
states should focus on enacting laws that actually prevent recidivism 
and educate society on real risks, rather than creating laws based on 
emotion, tradition and politics. Doe is a victory not only for the 
plaintiff in the case, but also for society, as it means that constitutional 
rights still exist even for the least popular members of society. While 
                                                 
237
 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-21 (2008) (requiring that the Violence Institute of 
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey undertake a comprehensive 
study of New Jersey’s sex offender laws).   
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Doe probably does not mean that sex offenders have found a friend in 
the courts, they may have one fewer enemy.   
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